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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
-vs-

10395

ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY,
Defendcmt and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is brought before the Court on Interlocutory Appeal under the provisions of Rule 72 (b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The nature of the action is
one in eminent domain, commenced by the Respondent
to acquire properties of the Appellant. Issues of law
relating to the constitutional validity of the legislation
establishing the Great Salt Lake Authority and the power
of that Agency to condemn the lands of Appellant are
raised in this Appeal.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
On May 26, 1965, the trial Court entered an Order
denying the Motion of Island Ranching Company to dismiss the Complaint in condemnation of the Respondent
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. On the same date, the lower Court also ordered
that the time in which Island Ranching Company was
otherwise required to respond to the Complaint, be extended so as to permit the Company to file with this
Court a petition for interlocutory appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It is submitted in this Appeal that the Order of
the trial Court denying Appellant's Motion to dismiss
should be reversed for errors of law and, that the case
be remanded to the District Court with directions to
dismiss the Complaint of Respondent for its failure to
state a claim as a matter of law, upon which relief can
be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts underlying this Appeal may be readily
capsulized. The Appellant, Island Ranching Company,
has been for many years last past and is now the owner
in fee simple of substantially all of that property known
as Antelope Island in the western section of Davis
County, Utah. In November of 1964, Respondent, Great
Salt Lake Authority (referred to in this Brief as
"GSLA"), filed a Complaint in the District Court for
Davis County to expropriate, by eminent domain, some
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4,198 acres of the Island, all of which property was
owned by the Appellant. (R. 1-3). Within the time permitted by Rule 12, U.R.C.P., Appellant filed a Motion
to dismiss (R. 4-5) the Complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. As a basis
for the Motion, it was specifically urged that:
1. The Enabling Act of GSLA (65-8-1 through
8, U.C.A. 1953, as amended) is constitutionally invalid and unenforceable for its failure to define the
territorial limits of the Agency's jurisdiction.
2. The GSLA Act is constitutionally invalid for
vagueness, lack of legslative standards and declared
public purpose.
3. Notwithstanding a finding of constitutional
enforceability of the Act, the Statute did not grant
to GSLA the power to acquire Antelope Island or
any part thereof by eminent domain.
4. That by reason of all or any of the foregoing, the condemnation of the Company's property
by GSLA would result in an unlawful expropriation
of the same in violation of Appellant's right to be
secure therefrom, and without due process of law,
contrary to Article I, Section VII, Utah State Constitution and Amendment XIV, United States Constitution.
Oral argument of counsel for the parties on these
issues was taken by the trial Court on the 8th day of
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February, 1965. Memoranda on the applicable law were
also submitted by counsel, respectively.
On May 25, 1965, the trial Court entered an Order
denying the Company's Motion to dismiss on all counts.
(E. 8-9). Appellant's Petition to this Court for interlocutory appeal and review of the lower Court's order
denying the Motion to dismiss followed in June, 1965.
(E. 15-28). This Court, under Order dated June 29,1965,
granted the Petition for interlocutory appeal and accepted jurisdiction to review the issues of law raised by
Appellant's Motion and set out in said Petition.
AEGUMENT
POINT I
THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT OF GSLA IS PEOPEELY TESTED
BY APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
It was before the trial Court and is the position
of Island Eanching Company herein that the Complaint
of GSLA fails, as a matter of law, to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted as against the Appellant.
Such Plea in Bar is properly raised by Motion under
Eule 12(b), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure. That Eule,
in part, provides:
"The following defense may at the option of
the pleader be made by motion: * * * (6) Failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
# # # >?

The Company, by the Motion, admits only the wellpleaded allegations of fact in the Complaint. Clark v.
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Nrbersee Finam Karp-traiimt, 332 U.S. 480, 68 S.Cl 174,
5)2 1 j.Ed. 148; Chicago Metallic Manufacturing
Company
v. Edward Katzinger Co., 1 23 F.2d 518 (7 Cir. 1 941 ).
Neither conclusions of law nor mixed statements of law
and fact set forth in the Complaint are, by Appellant's
Motion to dismiss, acknowledged or admitted. Newport
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. r. Schauffler, 303
C.S. 54, f)S S.Ct. 4(io\ s^ L.I<M. 7\M\\ IDS, ,-. PetriUo, 259
K *Jd 7-I5 «7 Cir. 19f>S). Moore, in his work on Federal
Practice, Wi II, Section 12.08, page 2244, outlines the
effect of a. i r ^ MM under "Rule 12(b) ( 6 ) :
"A motion to dismiss is the usual and. proper
method of testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. For the purposes of the motion, the wellpleaded material allegations of the complaint are
taken as admitted; but conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted."
Accordingly, only t\w ;:m';!'rn[I assertions of fact
under Paragraphs 2, 5, (i, 7 ami - oi' (JSLAV Complaint
are admitted by the Company under 1 lit* Motion i<> *l\<
miss. Conclusions embodied in the Complaint, for J"
purposes of the Motion, are denied.
POINT I I
T H E GSLA ACT I S CONSTITUTIONALLY
INVALID AND U N E N F O R C E A B L E FOR I T S
F A I L U R E TO D E F I N E OR DELIMIT T H E
T E R R I T O R I A L BOUNDARIES OF T H E
XOENCY'S JURISDIOTTHv
('

Island Ranching Company has standing to
raise the constitutional invalidity of the
' • GSLA Act.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
The rule is well settled that a private individual,
who is injuriously affected by an enactment of the legislature, may directly attack its constitutionality. Weber
v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 46 S.Ct. 320, 70 L.Ed. 654.
That is so because a legislative act which transcends
constitutional limitations is void ab initio. As stated
by this Court in State ex rel Univ. of Utah v. Candland
et al, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285 (1909):
"A legislative act which is in conflict with
the Constitution is stillborn and of no force or
effect — impotent alike to confer rights or to
afford protection. This general doctrine is adopted by the courts generally and is the doctrine
promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United
States, as appears from the case of Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 442, 6 Sup. Ct. 1125 (30
L. Ed. 178), where Mr. Justice Field, in speaking
for the court, says: 'An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
as though it had never been p a s s e d . ' "
While the interest of the individual litigant must be
directly infringed by the statute in order that a constitutional attack upon it be justiciable, Jackson v. City and
County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942),
it is not open to question that the estate of a landowner
whose property is sought to be condemned, satisfies
that standard. Illinois Dept. of Public Works v. Butler
Co., 13 111. 2d 537, 150 N.E. 2d 124 (1958). In the nature
of things, the condemnation action results in the devestiture of rights in rem held by the individual in the land.
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The warranties of the due process clauses require not
less than that such devestiture occur only if the statute,
which sanctions the expropriation, is constitutionally
adequate. Article I, Sec, VII, Utah Constitution; Amendment XIV, United States Constitution; Dartmouth College v. WoodwanK 4 Wii.«at i I'.S.) fn . ! L.lvl. 629
(1819); Hayes v. /'-,/•.• .,/ S<<atfh; 251 U.S. l-ft. 40 S.Ct.
125, 64 L, Ed. 234; People of CaL v. Skinner, 18 Cal. 2d
349, 115 P.2d 488; Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. I,
Page 442, Sec. 3.5. Accordingly, a landowner in eminent
domain may attack the validity of the Act establishing
the condemnor-agency. Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378
P.2d464 (Wash. 1963).
Since the rights of the Appellant in its property
have been placed in jeopardy by the Complaint of GSLA
to condemn part of Antelope Island, tin* standing nf
Appellant to challenge the constitutionality ni* tin* Enabling Statute, 65-8-1 llii-nu^li S, 1\<\A
\\)X\ as
amended, should he uncontested.
(.. ; The Legislature did not specify the jurisdictional boundaries of GSLA under the Act.
GSLA is a creature of the Legislature. Its power
to act is one of delegation and limitation. Delegation in
the sense that the responsibilities, assignments and functions stem from the Legislature. Limitation to the extent
that the power of the Agency is confined to and restricted by the proscribed and enacted law. Its Facilities are of a strictly derivative and nol inherent or selfstyled nature. Piercy v. Civil Service Com hi -/ Salt
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Lake City, 116 Utah 135, 208 P.2d 1123 (1949). The principle is recorded in Gouge v. David, 185 Or. 437, 202 P.2d
489 (1949):
"* * * A statute which creates an administrative agency and invests it with its power restricts it to the powers granted. The agency has
no powers except those mentioned in the statute.
I t is the statute, not the agency, which directs
what shall be done. That statute is not a mere
outline of policy which the agency is at liberty to
disregard or put into effect according to its own
ideas of the public welfare. * * *". P. 498 of 202
P.2d.
Corollary to the doctrine that an administrative
agency's power to act is measured by positive delegation
from the legislature, is the rule that the statute under
which the delegation is made, must particularly define
the geographical limits of the agency's jurisdiction.
Konold v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 16 Utah 151, 51 Pac.
256 (1897); Row ell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98
Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940). As an agency may not exercise substantive powers it does not possess, in parallel
fashion it may not function extraterritorially beyond the
reach of its land boundaries, Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 11 N.J. 43,
93 A. 2d 339 (1952), Knight v. Younkin, 61 Ida. 612, 105
P.2d 456, and an attempt to do otherwise is void from
the beginning. McGarry v. Industrial Comm. of Utah,
64 Utah 592, 232 Pac. 1090, 39 A.L.E. 306 (1925).
The requirement that the territorial boundaries of
the Agency's jurisdiction be charted, is satisfied only if
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such specification is a product of statutory definition and
not administrative assertion by the Agency, itself.
In De Loutch v. Scheper, 188 So. Car. 21, 198 S.E.
409 (1938) it was held:
"Concededly, the Legislature cannot delegate
to some administrative board the right to say what
territory shall be included within a political subdivision, for this is a duty which is devolved by
law upon it and one which it, and it alone, must
exercise."
So vital to the core of the Enabling Statute is the
requirement of territorial delimitation, that an Act which
fails such requirement is constitutionally unenforceable.
De Loutch v. Scheper, supra. In Revne v. Utah Trading
Comm., 113 Utah 155, 192 P. 2d 563 (1948), this Court
struck down the Barber Control Act as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. One of the obstacles in the Act (the lack of territorial boundaries)
was pointed out by the concurring opinion:
"Another reason affecting the validity of the
Act is that the Legislature has also failed to
furnish adequate territorial limits or guides. # * *"
(P. 176 of 113 Utah.)
An enabling statute which is not declarative of the
agency's territorial boundaries is unconstitutional not
only because of the uncertainty of the public body to
act, but also because the individual is left guessing as to
the nature of his rights under the enactment and its effect
upon his property. Such lack of notice is violative of due
process of law requirements. State of Utah v. Packard,
122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). Thus, the Illinois

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Supreme Court, in McDougall v. Lueder, 389 111. 141, 58
N.E. 2d 899 (1945), said:
"We have repeatedly held that, to be valid,
an Act may not be vague, indefinite and uncertain,
but must be complete when it leaves the Legislature and be sufficiently explicit to advise everyone what his rights are under it and how he will
be affected by its operation. * * *" (P. 906 of 58
N. E. 2d.)
So the question put to the Court in this Appeal is —
whether the territorial boundaries of GSLA are adequately defined by the Act, 65-8-1 et seq., U.C.A. 1953,
as amended.
At the outset, the obvious conclusion drawn from this
legislation is that it does not have state-wide significance.
Throughout the 9 Sections of the Act, the focus is somewhere near the geographical regions of Great Salt Lake,
far short of state boundaries. But apart from that fact,
a reading of the Act makes it crystal clear that the
territorial boundaries of GSLA are totally absent. There
is no declaration by meets and bounds, no established
markers, monuments or geographical limits set out in
any p a r t of the Statute. The singular reference to territorial area in the Act is found in 65-8-1 and 6 of the Act.
The former Section, having to do with membership of
GSLA, provides that appointment shall be predicated
upon "understanding of and interest in the Great Salt
Lake and its environs." Under 65-8-6, Paragraph 8, it is
provided that GSLA shall reserve revenues for the development and administration of "the Great Salt Lake
and its environs." Neither of the Sections is of assistance
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in determining the jurisdictional boundaries of GSLA.
The phrase, "Great Salt Lake and its environs" appears
but in connection with specific subject-matter, the first
with GSLA membership and the latter with administration of revenues. The phrase is given a generic and indeterminant usage and is not a declaration of territorial
limits.
Whether the coined phrase "Great Salt Lake and its
environs" includes exposed but former lake bed lands,
islands, beaches, tourist areas, arterial highways and the
like is uncertain. The word "environs" is no litmus since
that word implies only a meaning of surrounding influence and conditions. U. S. v. Amadio, 215 F . 2d 605
(7 Cir. 1954). Not once in the Statute has the Legislature
come close to a definitive statement of the boundaries of
GSLA. The latter is as wide or as narrow as the whims
of the members of the Authority dictate from time to time.
(3) The jurisdictional boundaries of GSLA cannot, under the facts of this case, be resolved
by reference to the title of the Act.
I t was argued by GSLA before the trial Court that
the defect in the Statute to define the geographical
boundaries of GSLA was really no defect at all, because
it was said, the title to the Act clearly describes the
territorial limits and for constitutional purposes, supplies any statutory deficiency.
That Title, as found in the Laws of Utah 1963,
provides:

"GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY
An Act Relating to the Development of All
of the Mainland, Islands, Minerals and Water
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Within the Great Salt Lake Meander Line Established by the United States Surveyor General;
Providing for the Creation of the Great Salt Lake
Authority to Formulate and Execute a Program
for Such Development and Appropriating $200,000 from the General Fund to the Great Salt
. Lake Authority." Laws of Utah 1963, Ch. 161, P .
566.
I t was thus claimed that the territorial boundary of the
Agency was the meander line as established by the U.S.
Surveyor General.
There are several reasons why the contention of
GSLA in this regard cannot stand. Foremost, is the
fact that the meander line is mentioned in the body of the
Statute but once, and only then in connection with the
division of operational revenues. 65-8-6, Paragraph 8.
The thrust of that P a r a g r a p h relates wholly to intramural activities of the Agency. Its use in the Statute
is plainly non-jurisdictional.
Secondly, is the fact that Section 65-8-6 of the Act
makes it quite clear that the meander line was not intended as a boundary line. Rather, as set forth in Paragraph 8 thereof, it is merely a reference point, within or
without which "the Great Salt Lake and its environs"
might fluctuate:
"The Authority shall not receive revenues
which accrue # # * from mineral leases * # * within
the Great Salt Lake Meander Line established by
the United States Surveyor General. All other
revenues, including such amounts as may be made
available by the legislature shall be reserved and
used in the development and administration of the
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Great Salt Lake and its environs by the Authority." 65-8-6, Para. 8. (Emphasis ours)
The Paragraph, in its larger context, indicates that the
meander line is but a part of the "Great Salt Lake and
its environs." If it were the legislative intent that the
meander line, so-called, was to be the jurisdictional
boundary, specific reference to it in Paragraph 8 above
was completely unnecessary. In that event, the Paragraph, as in other segments of the Act, would have
provided that mineral revenues, from lands within the,
"boundaries of jurisdiction," would accrue to the State
Land Board.
Thirdly, is the long accepted rule that jurisdictional
and constitutional requirements of a statute must be
found in the substantive legislation and not in the title.
Chabre v. Page, 298 Mich. 278, 299 N.W. 82 (1941); King
v. King, 193 Misc. 750, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 563 (1948); Donahue
v. Warner Bros. Picture Dist. Corp., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P.
2d 177 (1954). The latter is but a prologue, an expression
of purpose, an accessory to the Act. As declared by the
Arizona Court in Maricopa Co. v. La Prade, 45 Ariz. 61,
40 P. 2d 94 (1945):
"* * * It is the body, and not the title, which
determines whether the act is within the call for,
after all, the body is the true legislation; the
title and enacting clause being merely necessary
accessories thereto. * * *" (P. 98 of 40 P. 2d.)
Reference to a title may be made only to remove a latent
ambiguity in the statute, itself. Donahue v. Warner
Bros. Picture Dist. Corp., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177
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(1954); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. G. & 0. R. Co.,
331 U. S. 519, 91 L. Ed. 1646 (1946). I t cannot be used
to supply constitutional vitality to a Statute which is
otherwise deficient. A contrary conclusion would entail
a finding that the title is a p a r t of the statutory law, a
result which is clearly not the rule of the case.
Even were it concluded that resort may be had to
the title of the GrSLA Act to determine the territorial
boundaries, it is patent under the facts of this suit, that
such does not cure the constitutional inadequacy. The
title of the GSLA Act refers to the development of properties and water "within the Great Salt Lake meander
line established by the United States Surveyor General".
This Court may and will take judicial notice of official
acts of the U. S. Surveyor General in the establishment of
a meander line on the Great Salt Lake. 75-25-1 (3),
U.C.A. 1953. I t is an established fact that the United
States Surveyor had not, at the date of passage of the
GSLA Act or has he since, made a final or completed
survey or meander of the Great Salt Lake. The Attorney
General of Utah himself, has acknowledged the accuracy
of the point. Statement of Attorney General, Hearing of
U. S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Subcommittee on Public Lands, March 17,1965, Page 20.
Since the survey is not final or completed, there can be
no final or complete territorial boundaries of GSLA
under the Act, even with resort to the title.
Under the limits of the Statute, the scope of activity
of this Agency could run to Cache County on the north,
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Uintah Basin on the east, and St. George City on the
south, just as well as to Antelope Island, all dependent
upon how large a circle was selected by the Authority
as its measuring stick. Because of that fact and the inability of Appellant to determine the nature of its rights
under the Statute, 65-8-1 et seq. is constitutionally unenforceable.
POINT III
THE GSLA ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
INVALID BECAUSE OF UNLAWFUL
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHOR^
ITY AND STANDAEDS.
The decisional law of this Court is firm that an
administrative statute, to be constitutionally sustained,
must reasonably identify and circumscribe the powers,
duties, and responsibilities of the government agency,
as well as the regulatory standards under which it is
to operate. Nowers v. Oakden, 110 Utah 25, 169 P. 2d
108 (1946); McGrew v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
96 Utah 203, 85 P. 2d 608 (1938). In State of Utah v.
Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P. 2d 561 (1952), this court
quoted with approval Connally v. General Construction
Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322, wherein it
was said:
."A statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.'7
(P. 374 of 122 Utah.)
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The determined powers, functions and standards
must be those of the legislature and not the administrative body. The latter may do only what the statute
authorizes be done. Fiercey v. Civil Service Comm. of
Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 135, 208 P. 2d 1123 (1949). If
the statute is uncertain in the regulatory standards to be
employed or in the powers granted and leaves to the
Agency the determination of the same, the statute must
fall, for it is settled beyond argument that the legislature
may not delegate to an administrative body authority
to determine either the powers to be exercised or the
standard of operation. As stated by this Court in Bowell
v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 1
(1940):
"That the legislature may not surrender or
delegate its legislative power is elemental. * * *
But in the delegation of such authority, the legislature must clearly mark the course to be pursued,
and the principles, facts, and purposes to serve
as guide posts to enable the officer to carry out,
not his oivn will or judgment but that of the legislature/' (P. 358 of 98 Utah.)
The law does not require that the legislative act
define in infinite detail the agency's power and regulatory
criteria. McGrew v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, supra.
What is necessary is that there be in the enactment a
statement of functions having ascertainable limitations
and bounds, so that the statute does not become a mere
expression of desirable legislative policy. As set forth in
State of Kansas v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 P. 2d 865
(1947):
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"Mr. Chief Justice Hughes has stated that the
power must be limited by boundaries, circumscribing the limitation upon that power. Standards are difficult to define because of the variable
nature thereof. They have been referred to as
conditions, restrictions, limitations, yardsticks,
guides, rules, broad outlines and similar synonymous expressions hereinafter set forth. It has
been held that in the creation of administrative
tribunals the power given them must be "canalized" so that the exercise of the delegated power
must be restrained by banks in a definitely defined
channel. Ordinarily the standards must be sufficiently fixed and determined so that in considering
whether a section of a statute is complete or incomplete the test is whether the provision is sufficiently definite and certain to enable one reading
it to know his rights, obligations and limitations
thereunder. For present purposes it may be said
that a standard is a definite plan or pattern into
which the essential facts must be found to fit
before specified section is authorized." (P. 872 of
182 P . 2d.)
The GSLA Act is a legislative hodge-podge, a Statute
whose disciplines are dependent largely upon the
Agency's own notions of the public welfare and of its
periphery of operation. As already noted in Point I I of
this Brief (Pages 5-15), the Act is deficient in a primary requirement, the declaration of territorial boundaries of GSLA.
There is more to the argument of unconstitutional
delegation. Under Paragraph 3 of 65-8-6, GSLA is given
authority to define, by regulation, its power and jurisdiction over fish and game as between it and the State
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Department of Fish and Game. In part, Paragraph 3
provides:
"The state department of fish and game shall
retain the power and jurisdiction conferred upon
it within the boundaries of jurisdiction of the
Authority with reference to fish and game, subject
to such reasonable rules and regulations as the
Authority may make to insure the accomplishment
of the objectives and purposes of this act." (658-6, Para. 3). (Emphasis added.)
Under this Section, GSLA may, by unilateral action, fix,
prescribe or change its powers and responsibilities (and
parenthetically, the powers of the Department of Fish
and Game) on fish and game matters, to the detriment
and uncertainty of Appellant in its property and surrounding waters.
P a r a g r a p h 4 of 65-8-6 presents a pitfall of the same
nature. Therein, the State Land Board retains "authority
to manage state lands subject to reasonable rules and
regulations as the Authority may make to insure the
objectives and purposes" of the Act. Under this Paragraph, GSLA may, at its pleasure, administratively extend or contract its jurisdiction over the management of
state lands, vis-a-vis the functions of the State Land
Board and private parties under license, lease or contract
with the Land Board. The Appellant is never safe in its
dealings with the Land Board for the lease, occupancy
or use of state land, because under Paragraph 4 of 65-8-6,
it is eternally subject to a shifting set of rules and regulations issued by an independent agency, GSLA.
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The delegations of authority conferred under both
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Section are void, for they leave
to the Agency the definition of its jurisdiction as to which
a particular set of facts may fit, Krebs v. Thompson, Director, 387 111. 471, 56 N. E. 2d 761 (1944).
The Act delegates to GSLA power to "determine
the policies and develop the program * # * to accomplish
the objective and purposes" of the Law. 65-8-4 & 5, U.C.A.
1953, as amended. The latitude of operation permitted
under this statement is carte blanche. Such delegation
is invalid, for although the Agency is to have some discretion in the execution of statutory standards, those standards are of a legislative and not an administrative character. County of Alpine v. County of Tuolumne, 49 C. 2d
787, 322 P. 2d 449 (1958).
Furthermore, while the Act, in several parts, makes
reference to its "objectives and purposes," it is, in fact,
silent as to what those objectives and purposes are.
Viewed in its best light, the Act is merely suggestive of
the objectives which might be obtained. Under 65-8-6,
Paragraph 5, the Agency is to coordinate multiple use
of property "for such purposes" as grazing, fish and
game, mineral removal, development of water, industrial
resources and "other uses". In no sense is the Statute
directive. It provides only a cue as to several of many
courses of action which the Agency may or may not
pursue. Under the Rule in State v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300,
182 P. 2d 865 (1947), such uncontrolled power cannot be
constitutionally vested in an administrative board:
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"We can be certain of one test — a legislative
fiat which provides that an administrative agency
shall consider the elements which might affect
legislation and then act as it sees fit — does not
fix a standard." (P. 872 of 182 P . 2d.)
In contrast, a review of the enabling statutes of
other administrative agencies of Utah pointedly illustrates the delegation problem inherent in the GSLA Act.
See duties and powers of Utah State Road Commission,
27-12-8, U.C.A. 1953, as amended; Utah Fish and Game
Department, 23-1-1- and 14, U.C.A., 1953; and State Land
Board, 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953. The powers and responsibilities of those agencies are precisely defined.
Island Ranching Company is unable to ascertain its rights and those of GSLA under the
Act.
The nature of Appellant's objection to the GSLA
Act is not academic. I t rests, as in Point I I herein, on
the ground that the lack of standards (jurisdictional,
territorial, and regulatory) in the Law affords no notice
and renders ISLAND BANCHING COMPANY incapable of determining its rights as a property owner thereunder or the power of GSLA to affect those rights. Does
Antelope Island lie within the territorial boundaries of
GSLA? Is GSLA lawfully empowered to condemn the
Island, or parts of it? Does GSLA or the State Land
Board have the power to control state lands adjunct to
Antelope Island, and the lease, use and development thereof by Appellant ? The answers to these questions are open
game under the Statute. They are not in the GSLA Law
as they necessarily must be. The Act should accordingly
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be declared unconstitutional as in violation of Appellant's
right to due process of law as guaranteed by Article I,
Section VII, Utah Constitution and Amendments XIV,
United States Constitution.
POINT IV
T H E ENABLING ACT DOES NOT GRANT
TO GSLA P O W E R TO ACQUIRE ANTEL O P E ISLAND (or any part thereof) BY
E M I N E N T DOMAIN.
(1) The Statute empowers GSLA to acquire the
Island by voluntary and consensual means only.
If this Court upholds the GSLA Act as constitutionally enforceable, against the arguments advanced by
Appellant in Points I I and I I I herein, the issue whether
the Agency has been granted the power to condemn the
Company's property, Antelope Island, must yet be resolved. The key to that question lies in the Act, itself.
65-8-6, Paragraph 10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, is specific
as to the manner in which GSLA may acquire or obtain
Antelope Island:
"The Authority is authorized to take any
steps that are necessary to secure such p a r t of
Antelope Island by donation, purchase agreement,
lease, or other lawful means * * *." (Paragraph 10
of 65-8-6.)
The phrase "donation, purchase agreement, lease or
other lawful means" is decisive for it sets the sole
standard by which GSLA's power to acquire Antelope
Island is measured. Several methods are prescribed to
obtain the land. The Agency may accept a donation,
either inter vivos or testamentary. The Island, or parts,
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may be obtained through purchase agreement which conceivably would encompass a contract sale, a land ex^change or a combination thereof. A possessory estate
may be acquired by lease, inferentially, under mutually
acceptable terms and conditions.*
The means of acquisition are common in one regard.
Each and all require a voluntary transfer from the property owner to GSLA, a transfer which is based upon an
agreement of the parties and in all respects demands
acquiescence and consent of Island Eanching Company.
By definition, the power to condemn Antelope Island has
not been granted, for a taking through involuntary means
is excluded. Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6 is the only segment
of the law specifically concerned with the acquisition of
Antelope Island.
Nor does GSLA have a natural right or power to
condemn the Island. As to the State of Utah, eminent
domain is a right inherent in sovereignty, the exercise of
which is not dependent upon constitutional grace. Bauer
v. County of Ventura, 45 C. 2d 276, 289 P. 2d 1 (1955);
Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N. W.
2d 361 (1942). The capacity of GSLA, as an administrative arm of the State to condemn private property rests,
however, on far different grounds. Its authority to condemn is not a matter of right, but a power which is
operative only through a specific delegation and grant
from the legislature. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. I,
Page 314, Section 3.2 states the rule:
*The words "or other lawful means" in Paragraph 10 will be treated
in Sub-paragraph 2 of this Point.
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"The right to authorize the exercise of eminent domain is legislative, and there can be no
taking of private property for public use without
the consent of the owner and in the absence of
direct authority from the Legislature. The power
of eminent domain lies dormant until legislative
action is had, pointing out the occasions, modes,
agencies, and conditions for its exercise." (P. 314
of 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain.)
The rule that the powers, functions, and jurisdiction
of an administrative agency are confined to and limited
by statutory grant, Piercey v. Civil Service Comm. of
Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 135, 208 P. 2d 1123 (1949), is of
particular significance in the delegation of eminent domain power. That is so because the power requires an
express grant of the legislature, is never implied, and
is strictly construed against the agency seeking to exercise the same. Bertagnoli v. Baker, et al., 117 Utah 348,
215 P. 2d 626 (1950); Moyle et al v. Salt Lake City, 111
Utah 201, 176 P. 2d 882 (1947). In Bertagnoli, the Salt
Lake City Board of Education sought to condemn property, a part of which was contiguous to but without
the Board's territorial limits. The Board had been granted, by statute, power to condemn for school building
sites, but the law was silent on the matter of extraterritorial condemnation. The Board argued that the
power of eminent domain had been granted expressly,
and that together with its implied powers, gave to it a
constructive right to condemn extraterritorially. In re^
jecting the claim of the Board to condemn, this Court
recognized the Board was of limited authority:
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"In previous decisions of this court we have
recognized that boards of education are public
municipal corporations; that their powers are
purely statutory; * * * Also, that the boards of
education have only such powers as are expressly
conferred upon them and such implied powers
as are necessary to execute and carry into effect
their express powers. Chamberlain v. Watters,
10 Utah 298, 37 P. 566; Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P. 2d 900. Thus we must
examine the statutes of this state to determine the
extent of the authority given to boards of education to condemn land for proper purposes." (P.
627 of 215 P . 2d.)
This Court went on to say that the power of eminent
domain is antithetic to private ownership of property
and consequently, is exercisable only when expressly
authorized by Statute:
"When the power of eminent domain is given
by statute, it is a well settled principle of law
amply supported by cases from many jurisdictions in this country, that the extent to which
the power may be exercised is limited to the express terms and clear implication of the statute.
(Citing authorities) * * * The right of eminent
domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has been strictly
construed by the courts so that no person will be
wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of
his property. (Citing authorities) * * * " (P. 628
of 215 P. 2d.)
The decision of the Court dismissed the suggestion that
eminent domain could be constructively implied from
general legislation:
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"Thus it follows that the authority contended
for by the School Board not having been expressly
given and not being clearly inferable from our
statutes, must be denied it. Under the authorities
on this subject, power cannot be derived from the
doubtful inferences which support the School
Board's claim of authority." (P. 630 of 215 P. 2d.)
The concurring opinion in Bertagnoli emphasizes the
harshness of eminent domain and that its employment is
to be narrowly limited:
"I believe it well to emphasize the concept
that the right to condemn property is in derogation of common rights and permits the taking
away from a land-owner the property he desires to
retain. A man's home may be taken by the state
or one of its political subdivisions if the governing
body believes it necessary for a public purpose.
This is a drastic method of taking when considered from the viewpoint of the person whose property is condemned. Accordingly, we must jealously
guard the individual's rights and not infer the
authority unless the express purpose of the legislation demands that the power be vested in the
school board." (P. 630 of 215 P. 2d.)
In Moyle et al v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201,176 P.
2d 882 (1947), the eminent domain power was described
as arbitrary, the application of which should be guarded.
This Court remarked:
"The right of eminent domain is an arbitrary
power and so the construction has limited, confined and guarded the exercise of the right. * * *"
(P. 206 of 11 Utah.)
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The doctrine of strict construction is established as
the rule of law throughout the several states. In Beth
Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 248
P. 2d 732 (1952), it was held that the power to expropriate private property must clearly appear by legislative
grant:
"By necessary implication, above mentioned,
vague or doubtful language must be excluded. It
follows that if there is doubt, then there has been
no grant of such power by the State. . . . The
power is specifically and unequivocally granted,
or it is withheld." (P. 735 of 248 P. 2d.)
The Washington Supreme Court in State of Washington v. Superior Court, et al., 19 Wash. 2d 791, 144 P.
2d 916 (1944), was of the same judgment:
"The right to exercise the power of eminent
domain is one of the highest powers exercised by
the sovereign. This right will not be implied, nor
will it be extended beyond express statutory authority. The law is clearly stated in 1 Lewis on
Eminent Domain, 3d Ed., p. 679, §371, as follows:
'The exercise of the power being against common
right, it cannot be implied or inferred from vague
or doubtful language, but must be given in express
terms or by necessary implication. When the
right to exercise the power can only he made out
by argument and inference, it does not exist.
"There must be no effort to prove the existence of
such high corporate right, else it is in doubt, and,
if so, the state has not granted it." If the act is
silent on the subject, and the powers given by it
can be exercised without resort to condemnation,
it is presumed that the legislature intended that
the necessary property should be acquired by con-
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t r a c t / And p. 708, §388: 'All grants of power by
the government are to be strictly construed, and
this is especially true with respect to the power
of eminent domain, which is more harsh and peremptory in its exercise and operation than any
other.' " (P. 920 of 144 P . 2d.) (Emphasis ours.)
If, under the statute, doubt exists as to the power
to condemn, the finding must be against the agency seeking its use. As applied in the immediate case, the foregoing authorities hold that since Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6
fails to specifically grant to GSLA the power to condemn
Antelope Island, the acquisition of Appellant's property
is limited to donation, purchase agreement and lease,
modes all requiring the acquiescence of the property
owner. This is the net result unless the Court determines
that the phrase "or other lawful means," as used in
Paragraph 10 constitutes an adequate grant of eminent
domain power.
(2) The words "or other lawful means" following
the phrase "by donation, purchase agreement,
lease" in Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6 do not constitute a grant of eminent domain power to
GSLA.
The modifying clause "or other lawful means" in
Paragraph 10 cannot bestow upon GSLA the power to
condemn Antelope Island. Since eminent domain requires
a specific commission from the legislature, and since that
has not been granted GSLA herein, the phrase contains
no formula for an exercise of the power. To hold otherwise is to advocate a rule of "condemnation by statutory
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implication," an argument thoroughly repudiated in Bertagnoli v. Baker, (Utah) supra.
The true meaning of the phrase "or other lawful
means" in Paragraph 10, is not clear. Whether standing
alone or as a part of the larger paragraph, its use is both
ambiguous and indeterminate. Under such conditions, it
is necessary as well as appropriate that resort be had
to accepted canons of statutory construction to remove
the ambiguity and uncertainty. In Be Stevens' Estate,
102 Utah 255,130 P. 2d 85 (1942); Salt Lake Union Stockyards v. State Tax Comm. et al, 93 Utah 166, 71 P. 2d
538(1937).
Ejusdum Generis — Thing of Same Kind or Class.
This Court has employed ejusdum generis in a host
of cases to resolve legislative uncertainty. Memorial
Gardens of the Valley v. Love, 5 U. 2d 270, 300 P. 2d 628
(1956); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Distributing
Co., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177 (1954); Hansen v. Board
of Education of Emery County School District, 100 Utah
15, 116 P. 2d 936 (1941). Typical is the statement in
Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 U. 2d 196, 356 P. 2d 631 (1960)
wherein this Court said:
"The familiar and universally recognized rule
is that general terms following specific terms are
interpreted to mean things of like character."
(P. 204 of 11 U. 2d.)
As applied herein, the phrase "or other lawful
means" refers to methods of acquiring Antelope Island
of like stature and rank as those set out immediately
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preceding in Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6, i.e., donation, purchase agreement, and lease. It complements the existent
means of voluntary acquisition but does not add a new
class permitting an involuntary appropriation.
The use of this constructive aid is sound. If the
Legislature had intended that the words "or other lawful
means'' should be interpreted in an unlimited sense (to
include eminent domain), it would have provided that:
j-# # # rpjie Authority is authorized to secure such part
of Antelope Island by all lawful means.] As it stands,
no function is served by the words "donation, purchase
agreement, and lease" in Paragraph 10, unless by such,
the legislative intent was to establish a particular type or
class of acquisition procedures. Thus, in the case of
In Re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F. 2d 659 (2 C. A. 1938),
wherein the clause "oil, gas, gasoline and other combustibles" was under examination, it was determined that the
phrase did not include coal because:
"* * * if the Legislature had intended the
general words to be used in their unrestricted
sense, it would have made no mention of the
particular classes." (P. 606 of 93 F. 2d.)
See also Southern By. Co. v. Columbia Congress
Co., 280 Fed. 344 (4 C.A. 1922) where it was said:
"The words 'other or any other,' following an
enumeration of particular classes, are therefore
to be read as 'other such like,' and to include only
others of like kind of character." (P. 348 of 280.
Fed.)
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A case, whose facts are closely allied to those before
this Court is Lorenz, et at, v. Campbell, et al., 110 Vt.
, 3 A. 2d 548 (1939). There, the Vermont Court had
before it for interpretation a statute authorizing plaintiff
to condemn property for the "erection of a soldier's
monument or for other public purpose." The Town
Authority, under such enactment, attempted to condemn
land for a public park. Applying ejusdum generis, it was
held that the phrase "other public purpose" was restricted to the acquisition of property approximating the
same size as that to be used for a soldier's monument,
"In P. L. Section 3562, the statute which we
are considering, the words 'for the erection of a
soldier's monument' are followed by words of a
more general meaning, namely, 'or for other public purpose.'
"It is a rule of construction that when words
of a particular description are followed by words
of general import the latter can be held to include
only things similar in character to those specially
named."
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius — to enumerate is
to exclude.
Equally approved in this jurisdiction is the construction maxim that a specification of things or powers in
a statute eliminates all other things or powers not so
specified. This Court relied on the canon in Rapid
Transit Co. v. Ogden City, et al, 89 Utah 546, 58 P. 2d. 1
(1936). The question before the Court was whether
Ogden City had been granted, by statute, power to op-
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erate a bus system. The statute under reading gave the
City authority to maintain a street railway. Noting that
both street railways and motor buses were in common
usage at the time the law was enacted, this Court found
the power to be lacking and in so doing stated:
"Many reasons might be suggested why the
Legislature confined the grant of power to the
use and operation of street railways, but to do so
would be mere speculation. Whatever reasons the
lawmaking power my have had in mind is no concern to the courts whose duty it is to give effect to
the language used according to its fair import. I t
is one of the well recognized canons of statutory
construction that when a statute directs a thing
may be done by a specified means or in a particular manner it may not be done by other means or
in a different manner. The familiar maxim expressio ttnius est exclusio alterius is especially
applicable in the construction of a statute." (P.
551 of 89 Utah,)
The case of Village of Walthill v. Iowa Electric Light
and Power Co., 125 F . Supp. 859 (D. Neb. 1954) is of value
because of its likeness of facts and rationale. Therein,
the Village attempted to condemn defendant's gas distribution system for municipal use. The law of Nebraska
empowered the Village to condemn for a gas plant and
also provided that the Village should have power to take
private property "for any other public purpose." I t was
decisioned that eminent domain is strictly construed
against the condemnor, that a gas plant was not within
the framework of a gas distribution system, that the
statute by enumerating a gas plant, excluded therefrom
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the power to condemn for other gas facilities and lastly,
that the phrase, "any other public purpose" was limited
to the class particularly set out. It was said:
"The power of eminent domain is conferred
by statute in derogation of the common law, and
the statutes conferring the power should be construed strictly in favor of the landowner. (P. 863
of 125 F . Supp.)
"It is true that the words 'for any other public
purpose' appearing in the above statute are broad
enough to encompass the purpose of distributing
gas. However, these general terms are preceded
by a specific enumeration of public purpose property, namely, market houses, market places and
parks. Under the doctrine of ejusdum generis,
the general term 'any other public purpose' must
be limited to those purposes of the same general
nature or class as the ones enumerated, to wit,
market houses, market places and parks. * * * A
gas distribution system would not seem to be the
same general nature as a market place or park.
"It is interesting to note that the legislature,
by the same statute quoted above, vested the
villages with power to condemn for the purpose
of 'establishing or operating power plants' to
supply the villages with public utility service.
However, no express authority is given to condemn for the purpose of operating a distributing
system only; and under the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, no such
authority
should be implied"
The particular methods of acquisition having been
enumerated in P a r a g r a p h 10 of 65-8-6, the rule of con-
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struction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, excludes
other methods (eminent domain).
Admittedly, the canons of construction discussed in
this Point are not indelible. They are, rather, tools of
construction to aid in the interpretation of ambiguoujs
legislation. Mr. Justice Holmes referred to them as "axioms of experience." Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U. S. 41, 49 S. Ct, 52, 73 L. Ed. 170 (1928).
However, both axioms are logical and conventional, are
accepted at the common law, 68-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, and by
this Court, and both have application to the Statute
under consideration. Simply put, they warrant a finding
that the Statute empowers GSLA to acquire Antelope
Island by donation, purchase agreement, lease or by any
other means of like class and nature, none of which encompasses eminent domain.
(3) The "special" paragraph (10) in 65-8-6, U.C.A.
pertaining to Antelope Island, takes precedence over and controls the "genera!" paragraph (1) of that Section respecting the power
of eminent domain.
There is no contest that under Paragraph 1 of 658-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, GSLA is accorded the
power to condemn property, in general. That Paragraph
provides in part:
"The Authority shall have power * * * to
acquire real and personal property # * * by all
legal and proper means, including purchases,
gifts, devise, eminent domain, lease, exchange
# # # ?>
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It is the contention of GSLA that such grant is adequate for the condemnation of Antelope Island — the
argument being that since all parts of a statute should be
read in pari materia, the delegation of eminent domain
power in the general paragraph (1) has application to
and invades the language of the special paragraph (10),
the latter particularly touching upon the means of acquiring Appellant's land, Antelope Island, The issue thus
drawn is whether a general grant of eminent domain
power in a statute is controlled and limited by a subsequent or later reference in the same act to special
powers and means of acquiring particular property. The
question is to be answered in the affirmative.
That a general power in an act is controlled and
limited by a subsequent reference to special powers
affecting particular subject matter is supported by the
great weight of authority. In State ex rel. Public Service
Comm. v. Southern Pacific B. R. Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.
2d 25 (1938), this Court, mindful that all parts of a
statute are to be interpreted in relation to each other,
determined that a special provision in an enactment was
restrictive of a genera], power otherwise given therein.
This Court, through Folland C. J., said:
"Counsel for the State Tax Commission
argues that we should read together and harmonize Section 3 and 11 of article 13 of the Constitution, amended in 1930, and that by so doing we
can sustain the constitutionality of chapters 87
and 100, Laws of Utah 1937, on the theory that
the State Tax Commission may exercise the power
to assess until the Legislature prescribes regulaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tions which shall control the commision's discretion in the matter. Of course the two sections
must be read together and a definite meaning
attached to each. The rule, however, is that, where
there is a general provision and a specific one, the
specific must be given full effect. 11 Am. Jur. 663.
This rule of statutory construction was upheld
in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah
423, 209 P. 207, wherein it was said (page 208):
'Further, it is an elementary doctrine
that, where two statutes treat of the same
subject-matter, the one general and the other
special in its provisions, the special provisions control the general. State ex rel. Morck
v. White, 41 Utah 480, 126 P. 330; Nelden v.
Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524, 77 Am. St. Rep.
917; University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah
457, 59 P. 96, 77 Am. St. Rep. 928; Crane vs.
Reeder, 22 Mich. 322.'" (P. I l l of 95 Utah.)
In Bolls v. State of California, 19 C. 2d 713, 123 P.
2d 505, (1942), the California Supreme Court stated the
doctrine well:
"It is well settled, also, that a general provision is controlled by one that is special, the latter
being treated as an execption to the former. A
specific provision relating to a particular subject
will govern in respect to that subject, as against
the general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the
subject to which the more particular provision
relates." (P. 512 of 123 P. 2d.)
To the same effect, see also Bilyeu v. State Employees Retirement System, 58 C. 2d 618, 25 Cal. Rptr.
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562 (1962); Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P. 2d
528 (1947); Woods v. Spotumo, 183 Atl. 319 (Del. 1936).
While GrSLA has, therefore, the power to condemn
under the general Paragraph 65-8-6 (1), it does not have
the power with respect to Antelope Island, because the
special Paragraph, 65-8-6 (10) excludes eminent domain
as a means of acquisition. The two Paragraphs, when
read together, are productive of no other construction.
Both are saved and neither is rendered meaningless.
If the Legislature had intended that GSLA was to
have the power to condemn Antelope Island, it would
have provided so in one of two ways:
1. Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6 would have stated
that [The Authority is authorized # * * to secure
* * * Antelope Island by donation, purchase agreement, lease, eminent domain, etc.]; or
2, Paragraph 10 would have omitted all reference to means of acquiring Antelope Island. In
such event, the manner of acquisition would have
been determined by the general clause in Paragraph 1 of 65-8-6.
The fact is that the Legislature failed to adopt either
alternative although both were obvious. What was provided is that GrSLA may acquire Antelope Island by
donation, purchase agreement, lease and other lawful
means requiring a voluntary and consensual transaction.
To read the general language in Paragraph 1 of 65-8-6
into the specific clause in Paragraph 10 dealing with
Antelope Island is to emasculate the latter along with
most canons of statutory construction.
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POINT• V .
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IS TO INTERPRET THE STATUTE, AS IS, AND NOT
TO ENLARGE UPON IT.
The difficulties with the GSLA Act are neither fanciful nor illusory. They are inherent in the very essence of
the Statute. The Act is without a pronouncement of territorial boundaries. There is a substantial dearth of legislative standards, of proscribed responsibilities and regulatory guides. GrSLA may pretty well do as it desires,
for its authority is undefined. The trouble with that
is that under such an Act, Appellant is denied notice as to
its rights and liabilities and in that regard, whether attempted conduct of GSLA is statutorily licensed. While
the powers and standards of the Agency under the
Statute must necessarily allow for discretionary and administrative action, they must have their limits or the
due process clause is gone. Those limits have been far
exceeded in this Act.
The constituitional rights of Appellant to be secure
in its property against unlawful expropriation is on the
line in Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6. The import of that Section is plain — the means of acquiring Antelope Island
are voluntary and consensual and are exclusive of the
power of eminent domain.
In determining the questions thus posed, the processes of this Court are interpretative, not legislative.
The constitutionality of the Act and the power of GSLA
to condemn Antelope Island are judged not by those
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policies which now seem wise, not by the factors which
should have been but were not placed in the Law, and
not by what the Legislature could have done but did not
do; but upon, what, in fact, the Statute says. To explore
the latter is the task of this Court, On the subject of
judicial restraint, the late Mr. Justice Frankfurter had
a few words of caution for the bench and bar:
"Even within their area of choice, the courts
are not at large. They are confined by the nature
and scope of the judicial function in its particular
exercise in the field of interpretation. * * * As a
matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will
gainsay that the function in construing a statute
is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected
legislature. The great judges have constantly
admonished their brethern of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge must
not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to
contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation.
* # * #

"This duty of restraint, this humility of function as merely the translator of another's command, is & constant theme of our Justices. It is
on the lips of all judges, but seldom, I venture to
believe, has the restraint which it expresses, or the
duty which it enjoins, been observed with so consistent a realization that its observance depends
on self-conscious discipline. Cardozo put it this
way: 'We do not pause to consider whether a
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statute differently conceived and framed would
yield results more consonant with fairness and
reason. We take this statute as we find it.' It was
expressed more fully by Mr. Justice Brandeis
when the temptation to give what might be called
a more liberal interpretation could not have been
wanting. 'The particularization and detail with
which the scope of each provision, the amount of
the tax thereby imposed, and the incidence of the
tax, were specified, preclude an extension of any
provision by implication to any other subject. . . .
What the Government asks is not a construction of
a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the
court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertance, may be included within its scope.'
An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend
the inclusion.
# * # #

"The difficulty in many instances where a
problem of meaning arises is that the enactment
was not directed towards the troubling question.
The problem might then be stated, as once it was
by Mr. Justice Cardozo, 'which choice is it the
more likely that Congress would have made?'
While in its context the significance and limitations of this question are clear, thus to frame the
question too often tempts inquiry into the subjective and might seem to warrant the court in
giving answers based on an unmanifested legislative state of mind. But the purpose which a
court must effectuate is not that which Congress
should have enacted, or would have. It is that
which it did enact, however inaptly, because it may
fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even
if a specific manifestation was not thought of, as
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;

is often the very reason for casting a statute in
very general terms." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Beading of Statutes, 47 Colum. Law
Rev. 527 (1947).

The jurist finished by saying:
"But there are more fundamental objections
to loose judicial reading. In a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come
from those popularly chosen to legislate, and
equipped to devise policy, as courts are not. The
pressure on legislatures is to discharge their responsibility with care, understanding and imagination should be stiffened, not relaxed. Above
all, they must not be encouraged in irresponsible
or undisciplined use of language. * * * Their responsibility is discharged ultimately by words.
They are under a special duty therefore to observe
that 'Exactness in the use of words is the basis
of all serious thinking. You will get nowhere
without it. * * * You must master the use of them,
or you will wander forever guessing at the mercy
of mere impulse and unrecognized assumptions
an!d arbitrary associations, carried away with
every wind of doctrine.' " Frankfurter, Some Beflections on the Beading of Statutes, 47 Colum.
Law Rev. 527 (1947); Allen, Essay on Jeremy
Bentham, The Social and Political Ideas of the
Revolutionary Era, 181, 199 (Hearnshaw Ed.
1931).
Frankfurter's reflections are in point in the consideration of the Act herein.
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CONCLUSION
The GSLA Act is constitutionally unenforceable for
its failure to define the jurisdictional boundaries. It
denies to Appellant due process of law as secured by
State and Federal Constitution. In all events, the Act
does not grant to GSLA the power to condemn Antelope
Island or its parts.
The Order of the trial Court denying Appellant's
Motion to dismiss should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the Respondent's
Complaint.
Respectfully Submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS &
LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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